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Abstract 
 
This study will evaluate certain proposals on banking regulation brought forward by experts in 
Banking and Economics and their applicability not just on traditional Banks but on Shadow 
Banking and the Financial System as a whole, using a scoring system.  
 
Prof. Anat Admati, Prof. John Cochrane and Jonathan McMillan (pseud.) have devised their 
own policy frameworks on how to regulate the Financial System in order to prevent future 
crises and make the system safer.  
 
Given the ongoing debates on how our financial system should be regulated it makes sense to 
measure how well these proposals would serve in addressing problems associated with Banking 
as well as Shadow Banking.  
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Introduction 
“Shadow Banking” as a term was first mentioned by former PIMCO Managing Director Paul 
McCulley in 2007 to describe risky off-balance sheet vehicles set up by banks to sell securitized 
loans (The Economist, 2016). The scope under which financial intermediary companies should 
be considered a shadow bank remains disputed and depends on subjective definitions and 
judgement (ICMA, 2012). Generally speaking, any corporate entity that performs bank-like 
functions such as maturity transformation while not being a fully supervised financial 
institutions (FI) could be categorized as a shadow bank. This means it does not fall under the 
typical regulatory requirements (i.e. Capital ratios, Liquidity requirements etc.) while also not 
obtaining “explicit” access to central bank funding or deposit insurance (IMCA, 2012; Reuters, 
2012). Specialized Investment Banks, Insurance Companies, Money Market Funds, Private 
Equity/Debt and even some online technology firms can hence all be classified as shadow 
banking entities. The main amplifiers for the Global Financial Crisis (“GFC”) were certain 
shadow banking activities, mainly off-balance sheet conduits/Special Purpose Vehicles 
(“SPVs”) which were sponsored by traditional banks to circumvent (capital-)regulation. In the 
years leading up to the 2007/2008 GFC one saw a steep increase in the Mortgage Backed 
Security (“MBS”) market as well as the market for Asset Backed Commercial Papers (“ABCP”) 
(Sanches, 2014). Defaults in these markets are considered to be the initiating cause of bank-run 
like activity that caused the repo- and general credit markets to freeze up. This led to extreme 
illiquidity constraints and soon to insolvencies for formerly major financial actors such as 
Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns (NYT, 2014). Since the GFC these particular shadow 
banking activities considerably reduced their securitization activity.  In 2007 $11.2trn worth of 
securitized products were brought to market in the US while the securities created in the 
Eurozone were worth € 595bn. However, in 2015 the US securitization merely stood at $ 1.9trn 
and €214bn in Europe respectively (Schwarcz, 2018). The reasons for the development of 
shadow banking can be linked to two fundamental drivers. First, as regulatory oversight of 
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traditional banks has strengthened substantially, regulatory arbitrage has become ever more 
attractive over the decades: “(…) traditional banks are retreating from markets with a larger 
regulatory burden, and (…) shadow banks fill this gap” (Buchak et al, 2018). Secondly, 
technological innovations, especially online/digital, make new types of credit 
provision/intermediation easy and fast to set up meaning capital can be channeled and managed 
more easily outside the traditional banking system (Maiello, 2017). Research suggests that 60% 
of new shadow banking activity in the US mortgage lending market can be attributed to 
regulatory arbitrage, whereas 30% is due to technological innovations (Buchak et al, 2018).  As 
regulators are very aware of the role Shadow Banking played in the GFC, there has been much 
discussion regarding the adequate regulatory treatment of the non-traditional banking sector. 
Shadow Banking activities have continuously undergone regulatory updates by the likes of 
Basel III and the Dodd-Frank Act. This led to the previously mentioned drop in certain shadow 
banking activities like securitizations and the “typical” shadow banking activities have lost their 
power of enabling regulatory arbitrage to boost returns.  
 
Since the GFC, Fintech and P2P lending have received growing attention due to their potential 
to challenge traditional ways of how we conduct banking. It is even welcomed by regulatory 
bodies: “(…) FinTech credit activity could present a range of benefits (…)” (BIS&FSB, 2017). 
Yet, taking a closer look at recent developments of P2P credit intermediation reveals the same 
old patterns that we saw in the run up to the GFC. Especially the larger P2P lenders have 
engaged in securitizations of P2P loans and credit provision from banks. “Not too long ago, the 
interaction between banks and online lenders seemed to be limited to partners, competitors, 
investors, or a combination of the three. Now, these relationships have expanded; in some 
instances, banks are now providing online lenders their credit facility products without the 
trade-off of a loan origination partnership for those credit facilities. This pure provider-
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customer relationship is yet another compelling example of just how intertwined the ecosystem 
has become.” (Deloitte, 2018). 
For example, certain Hedge Funds and even traditional banks have in recent years bought up 
respectively created securitized loans originated by P2P lending platforms. In 2015 Citi 
launched a partnership providing a $150m credit facility for the alternative asset management 
firm Varedo Capital which will use the money for investments in market place loans from P2P 
platforms and some smaller community banks have even directly invested into P2P (Press 
release – Lending Club, 2015).  P2P marketplace loans even experience securitizations into 
ABSs, which are again rated by the likes of S&P, just as before the GFC. (Press release – SoFi, 
2015).  Such ABSs are then for instance purchased by Hedge Funds who can use them as 
collateral for obtaining funding from MMFs who are enjoying implicit GVT guarantees.  These 
linkages now strikingly resemble the shadow banking system which contributed to the GFC. 
Bank of England Governor Mark Carney formulates his own concern as well: “It is not clear 
the extent to which P2P lending can grow without business models evolving in ways that 
introduce conventional risks. Were these changes to occur, regulators would be expected to 
address such emerging vulnerabilities (…)” (Mark Carney – Bank of England, 2017). 
P2P loan volumes securitized into ABSs are still small. In 2018 it will probably amount to ca. 
$18bn according to PeerIQ, a tiny fraction of the trillions of assets held by banks overall. 
(Bloomberg, 2018). However, its growth has been noteworthy as only in 2013 P2P loan 
securitization really started.      
 
The first part of this paper will be a literature review on current shadow banking regulation. In 
the second part I will use a scoring system to evaluate certain approaches suggested towards 
banking regulation and their applicability on shadow banking. Those suggestions come from 
Prof. Anat Admati, Prof. John Cochrane and Jonathan McMillan. 
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Literature Review  
Financial Stability Board – Assessment of shadow banking activities, risks and the 
adequacy of post-crisis policy tools to address financial stability concerns  
The Financial Stability Board (“FSB”) has been highly influential in shaping policy response 
for the banking and shadow banking system since the GFC. It regularly publishes reports and 
studies to be discussed by the G20 in particular. In a 2017 review the FSB assessed the current 
state of shadow banking and drew a number of conclusions. The FSB observes that many 
shadow banking activities, mostly securitizations which contributed to the GFC, have since 
drastically decreased in volume as can be seen in the chart below. This is mainly the case for 
securitized off-balance sheet conduits with explicit/implicit bank sponsoring. Major regulatory 
changes have made these types of shadow banking activities much less attractive. This is due 
to regulation aimed at balance sheet consolidation of SPVs with their sponsors, an overhaul of 
risk-weights, and retention requirements to align incentives with the originator (“skin in the 
game”). The FSB openly appreciates this development. Regarding Money Market Funds 
(“MMFs”), the FSB claims that they have become more resilient, mainly due to the introduction 
of the VNAV rule. Albeit, the FSB notes: “While policy tools have been created to convert a 
portion of MMFs into floating NAV products, there is still some concern that they are prone to 
run risk in the event of unexpected losses”. This concern is indeed vindicated as “in some 
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instances Floating-NAV MMFs have indeed still experienced runs, mainly in Europe” 
(Adrian&Ashcraft, 2012). The FSB omits to make the point that MMFs are often used in the 
cash-management by corporations, who are in favor of the fixed face-value of CNAV MMFs. 
The VNAV ruling in the US and EU might therefore lead to investments flowing out of such 
MMFs (Dierking, Mutualfunds.com, 2017). Overall the so called Economic Function 1 (“EF1”) 
of the FSB’s Narrow Measure of non-banks (i.e. shadow banks) has grown the most in recent 
years (11% in 2016 alone). EF 2-5 however have decreased in size. The EF1 comprises 
Collective Investment Vehicles (“CIVs”) which represent Fixed Income funds, Credit Hedge 
funds, MMFs and other investment fund vehicles which entail run-risk. The FSB remarks that: 
“(…) the considerable growth of certain investment funds combined with a relatively high 
degree of credit risk, as well as liquidity and maturity transformation, and, in the case of 
jurisdictions that reported hedge funds, relatively high levels of leverage.” Contrary to its 
recognition of the risks by CIVs, the FSB then concludes that it has not identified any new 
systemic risks for the financial system as a whole outgoing from shadow banks which would 
require additional global regulatory updates. The FSB mainly calls for international 
collaboration on regulation to avoid regulatory arbitrage. In addition, it puts a high value on 
strengthened monitoring standards which allegedly promotes early recognition of systemic 
risks by regulators.  
Source: FSB 
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Association of German Banks (“bankenverband”) – Regulation of shadow banking – 2014  
The Association of German Banks published a report in 2014 named “Regulation of shadow 
banking”. The report analyses mainly the directives applicable to the UK&EU and the US. It 
highlights the fact that demand for shadow banking products was a main driver behind the 
growth of the non-banking financial system. Companies, institutional investors but also insurers 
and pension funds and individuals were searching for safe, liquid, short-term securities they 
could use for their cash management and investment. The bankenverband welcomes the 
activity-based approach that current banking regulation takes. This helps to prevent banks from 
bypassing regulation via unregulated entities/conduits. The bankenverband depicts the 
objectives of current (shadow) banking regulation as follows: “firstly, reforming accounting to 
reduce the scope that banks have for influencing the size of their balance sheets by using 
shadow banking entities; secondly, raising the capital requirements for transactions with 
shadow banking entities; thirdly, limiting the size of exposures to shadow banks. On top of this, 
riskier banking activities are to be separated from supposedly safe deposit-taking business by 
reforming the structure of banks.” As identified by the FSB, the bankenverband makes the point 
that in the US and UK&EU new regulation mainly led to upsurges in supervision and updates 
of accounting and reporting rules which now render traditional sponsored securitization 
activities much less attractive for banks. This is in line with the drop in certain shadow banking 
activities as observed by the FSB. Securitization sponsoring (of MBS conduits for example) in 
the mortgage market plummeted following the GFC and those that still exist are much better 
accounted for regarding their risk. Major updates are i.e. FAS 166/167 and DFA 165 (k) in the 
US and similar ones in the EU through Basel III but also the AIFM Directive and UCITS 
Directive for non-bank financial companies. The bankenverband argues that regulating the 
securitization market is a difficult task as its participants are highly heterogenous. Further, 
securitized products are often distributed internationally which means that regulation should 
also be implemented on a global scale to avoid competitive distortion and geographical 
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regulatory arbitrage.  On that point, the report cites IOSCO’s opinion that sufficient cross-
border compatibility seems to prevail for now regarding regulatory regimes of securitizations. 
With regards to MMFs, the bankenverband makes a stronger point than the FSB, as it deems 
the change of CNAV to VNAV as insufficient. It considers the effect of a capital buffer or shift 
from CNAV to VNAV weaker than hoped. In a looming crisis there would still be a first-mover 
advantage for those investors “running” to redeem their holdings first. Accordingly, the first-
mover advantage could only be mitigated by a “Minimum Balance at Risk” for the investors 
thereby disincentivizing them to fire-sell their holdings of the MMF.  The Volcker rule as part 
of the Dodd-Frank Act and in some sense a lighter version of the Glass-Stegall Act (WSJ 2017), 
is disputed as it’s argued that it doesn’t make banks any safer because they can still engage is 
risky “regular” lending despite being ring-fenced (Michel, Fortune.com, 2018). Such critique 
however is not raised by the bankenverband. It rather perceives an increased risk of migration 
from investors and lenders to shadow banks, as the mounting regulations make regular banking 
less attractive. This conclusion is in line with many other literature findings as indicated 
previously.  
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The following section will analyze the applicability of various regulatory proposals from three 
different academics and economists. A matrix structure will be used for this purpose. Four pain 
points have been identified with Shadow Banking, each bearing varying severity and hence are 
allocated different weights.   
 
 
 
Weight/Relevance 
(3 highest, 1 lowest) 
 
Problem (from shadow 
banking) 
Suggested solution on banking regulations and their applicability on 
shadow banking 
Prof. Anat Admati Prof. John Cochrane Jonathan McMillan 
Score Total Score Total Score Total 
3 Crisis potential  1.5 4.5 1.5 4.5 2.5 7.5 
2 
Risk for 
depositors/investors 
1.5 3 2 4 2 4 
2 Implementation 2.5 5 1.5 3 0.5 1 
1 Regulatory arbitrage 0 0 1.5 1.5 2 2 
 Sum Total 5.5 12.5 6.5 13 7 14.5 
 
The potential solutions brought forward are then scored from 0 to 3 regarding their value in 
addressing the problems. The score will be allotted using research in relevant literature and 
publications. The score is then multiplied with the weight of the problem (1 to 3) and ultimately, 
we will have a sum total of weighted scores for each suggested solution. Eventually, this will 
provide insight into how shadow banking can be regulated best using the three approaches.  The 
final results can already be seen in the table above.  
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Crisis Potential 
Shadow Banking activities pose a risk for the overall economy and have the potential to cause 
a future crisis. As highlighted beforehand, shadow banks, mainly SPVs and MMFs, have been 
a root cause of the GFC (Sanches 2014). Bankrupt financial institutions can hurt the general 
economy through a prompt reduction in financial services. Taxpayers are hurt through costly 
bail-outs. Shadow banks can grow over time to have systemic impact when failing. 
 
Risk for Depositors/Investors 
Any fund providers of shadow banks and FIs in general are exposed to risks on their holdings, 
whether they are in short-term liabilities or equity. Current deposit insurance aims to protect 
depositors from runs. The Basel Accords indirectly protect those all those who finance the 
operations of the FI by trying to reduce malpractice which leads to illiquidity and insolvency 
issues.  Regulation should ideally mitigate such risk.   
 
Implementation 
The feasibility of implementing a certain policy is of great importance for its effectiveness. This 
factor will weigh in on the overall value of a proposed regulatory framework.  
 
Regulatory Arbitrage 
Regulatory arbitrage occurs by operating banking and financial intermediary activities in a way 
that the regulatory burden, may it be on capital or else, would be minimized (Stulz et al.). 
 
Prof. Anat Admati  
Stanford Finance Professor Anat Admati brings forward the key statement that her research 
suggests the only viable way to regulate Banks is through a steep increase in equity capital to 
total assets.  She suggests that a ratio of “(..) [ca.] 30% on an unweighted basis should not be 
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unthinkable” (Admati et al, 2013).  Admati basically dismisses any other regulatory proposals 
such as the usage of hybrid securities like Contingent Convertible Bonds (“CoCos”). She argues 
that the only truly functioning structural changes by which the financial system could be made 
safe is through substantial leverage reductions on a straight equity basis. This can be achieved 
in 3 ways. Either through balance sheet contraction by a reduction in debt, keeping the amount 
of equity the same. Alternatively, one can expand the Balance Sheet by adding extra equity to 
the existing positions. Finally, by deleveraging over time as debt positions would be replaced 
by equity while overall maintaining the size of the Balance Sheet. Admati does not call for a 
specific policy that would prevent banks from shrinking their balance sheet in order to comply 
with higher leverage ratio regulation. Yet, balance sheet contraction might be chosen (at least 
temporarily) by many banks which would then negatively impact on credit provision for the 
overall economy. This was actually observed as being the case for some European Banks post-
GFC (EBA Staff -Paper, 2018).  
 
University of Chicago Professor Roger B. Myerson reviewed Admati’s framework and concurs 
with the positive impact of more equity on the loss-absorbency ability of a bank. In his view it 
is also a prudential incentive to monitor the risks of the assets of the bank by shareholders: 
“[More equity has two effects.] For any given level of risk in the bank's investments, the 
probability of investment losses large enough to affect the depositors becomes smaller when 
the bank has more equity. But more equity also means that the owners who control the bank 
have more incentive to avoid risks of such large losses. That is, equity helps to solve moral 
hazard in banking.”  
Additionally, some empirical research on time-series data shows that higher bank equity ratios 
has no negative impact on loan volumes provided and the overall growth of the economy 
(Goldstein, 2013). Hence the proposed surge of the equity capital ratio should not lead to 
negative repercussions in the economy in the long-term. Yet, this is a debatable claim by the 
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mere fact of debt being tax deductible, henceforth the threshold for businesses/projects in 
obtaining financing by a bank would be increased using Admati’s policy. 
With Admati’s admittedly very simple approach come substantial problems regarding shadow 
banking. Economist John Cochrane, who himself favors run-prone debt regulations and 
Pigouvian taxes, argues that mere capital regulations on banks will not prevent risks that are 
outgoing from shadow banks. In his view we would observe migration of capital into risky and 
less regulated shadow-banking entities: “(…) [new] capital ratios (…) [are] subject to the same 
games as the last round of capital ratios, especially given the huge increase in complexity of 
capital ratio regulation.” (Cochrane, 2014). Admati herself advocates a straight raise of equity 
ratios without the use of risk-weights as currently the case under the Basel Accords. Yet, she 
clearly fails to explicate the issue raised by Cochrane concerning the “gaming” of the system 
following simple equity ratio increases. Moreover, she ignores to elaborate on changing risk-
taking behavior by FIs if they are put under higher leverage constraints. As Economist Sato 
Takafumi avers: “(…) bigger capital requirements may induce complex risk-taking.” 
(Takafumi, FT, 2009). Admati’s simple assumption that a substantial increase in the equity 
ratio, disregarding the asset side of banks’ balance sheet will suffice is rightfully doubted within 
the banking community itself (Perona, 2013). 
  
While acknowledging the relevance of shadow banks within the financial system Admati 
surprisingly dismisses to focus on them deliberately from a regulatory point of view: “In the 
context of this discussion an indiscriminate reference to ‘the shadow banking system’ is 
unhelpful. Institutions outside the regulated sector that operate without sponsors from the 
regulated part of the financial system tend to have significantly less leverage than regulated 
banks.” (Admati et al. 2013). She recognizes the importance shadow banking played in firing 
up the GFC, yet her recommendations and synopsis never depict concrete measures to ensure a 
higher equity ratio on banks of i.e. 30% won’t lead to capital/investment shifts to shadow banks 
- 14 - 
 
who could become systemically important. Bank & Shadow Bank depositors respectively 
investors could again be put at high risk through direct (balance sheet) or indirect exposure 
between the traditional banks and shadow banks. In that sense, if regulators would genuinely 
follow the suggestion of Admati and essentially abandon every other regulatory measure taken 
to this day, this doubtlessly reverses the fall in the volumes of (risky) off-balance sheet conduits, 
securitizations, etc.  These two main points of critique are stated in the Journal “European 
Economy – Banks, Regulation, and the Real Sector”: “As a consequence, increased capital 
requirements might induce banks to invest in riskier assets, with higher expected returns but 
also more severe tail risks. This could expose banks to higher risks. In addition, from a systemic 
point of view, there is the further issue that more risky activities could end up being carried out 
through non-regulated shadow vehicles” (European Economy, 2015).  
 
Given this, I score Admati’s solution the following: 
Crisis Potential: Total score 1.5 of 3. A higher equity ratio will make banks more resilient ceteris 
paribus. However, Banks would with all likelihood increase their risk-taking over time. Such 
Moral Hazard issue is not really addressed by Admati. Shadow Banking would commence to 
flourish again, just as before the GFC. A study by IMF researcher Jihad Daher et al. show that: 
“(…) once capital ratios reached around 23 percent, the marginal benefit of raising them 
further started to shrink; nearly the same percentage of crises were avoided as when capital 
minimums were at 30 or even 40 percent” (Philadelphia FED, 2018). Simultaneously, the 
Minneapolis FED estimates that an increase of capital ratios to around 23.5% implies an annual 
GDP drop of up to 1.52% and a rise in average loan interest rates by 60bps. (Philadelphia FED, 
2018). Barth and Miller write in the Journal of Risk and Financial Management that                           
“ (…) simply adding more capital requirements is not the way to promote a safer and sounder 
banking system” (J. Risk Financial Manag. 2018, Vol. 11 (4)). 
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Risk for Depositors/Investors: Total score: 1.5 of 3. Again, the higher equity ratio will in 
concept make an insolvency more unlikely if everything else remains constant. Yet, the failure 
of Admati to explicate how everything else would remain constant with no increased risk-taking 
by banks remains. This makes me infer that depositors and any kind of investors in Financial 
Intermediaries are in the medium to long-term exposed to considerably growing risks in terms 
of the liquidity situation of the FI. Investors/Depositors in somewhat longer-term debt from FIs 
are equally exposed to the higher risk. No clear strategy is set out by Admati that investors in 
MMFs or other shadow banking entities would benefit from the higher equity ratio regarding 
their risk. 
 
Implementation: Total score: 2.5 of 3. Admati’s policy proposal would be fairly easy to 
implement. As we have the 3% equity/asset ratio under Basel III today it would simply mean 
raising that ratio to i.e. 30%. Conceptually and structurally not much would change.  
 
Regulatory arbitrage:  Total score: 0 of 3. Admati’s proposal is in no way addressing the issue 
related with regulatory arbitrage through shadow banking activities. Regulatory arbitrage would 
be an inevitable consequence of her policy framework. Shadow banking conduits would 
experience a substantial revival. 
 
Prof. John Cochrane  
John Cochrane is Economics Professor at Chicago Booth. In his paper “Toward a run-free 
financial system” Cochrane calls for the restructuring of liabilities on banks’ balance sheets. He 
argues that run-prone short-term liabilities such as deposits are the main factor causing a bank-
run and ultimately a financial crisis. Banks’ abilities to hold these liabilities as they do today 
should be massively restricted. Cochrane clearly outlines that in fact the run began in the 
shadow banking system and following constrains (i.e. liquidity issues, fire sales, etc.) it spread 
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over to the general financial system: “At its core, our financial crisis was a systemic run. The 
run started in the shadow banking system of overnight repurchase agreements, asset-backed 
securities, broker-dealer relationships, and investment banks.” (Cochrane, 2014). Cochrane 
envisions the case where banks’ deposits as well as MMFs and Repo providers must be backed 
entirely by short-term Treasury securities. Given that MMFs have already undergone regulation 
to remove runnability he admits the better standing of MMFs today, yet he upholds his own 
framework as the preferable solution.  
 
Cochrane deems asset regulation (for example via risk-weights) a vain exercise. He puts 
forward his point that regulation should concentrate on the liability side, by eliminating 
runnability. Regulating asset activities is of lower priority to him: “The story of how banks 
evaded risk regulation and capital regulation (…) is a good warning against putting too much 
faith in longer and more detailed asset and capital regulation in the future.” (Cochrane, 2014). 
In order to enforce restrictions regarding short-term debt he also suggests a Pigouvian tax model 
that applies a certain flat rate on each Dollar held by a traditional bank and not backed by 
treasuries.  Overall Cochrane also supports the “systemic run view” which argues that 
regulating the interconnectedness is fairly meaningless as the GFC demonstrated that runs 
happened to a range of banks regardless of their actual balance sheet connectedness with 
struggling entities (Cochrane, 2014). Further, he recognizes that any institution, whether official 
bank or not can grow and become dangerous if issuing runnable debt. Cochrane propagates: 
“In this vision, demand deposits, fixed-value money-market funds, or overnight debt must be 
backed entirely by short-term Treasuries. Investors who want higher returns must bear price 
risk. Intermediaries must raise the vast bulk of their funds for risky investments from run-proof 
securities. For banks, that means mostly common equity, though some long-term or other non-
runnable debt can exist as well. For funds, or in the absence of substantial equity, that means 
shares whose values float and, ideally, are tradable.” (Cochrane, 2014). 
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A potential issue here is the definition of runnable debt. Cochrane makes no clear description 
of what he considers “run-prone”. Thus, if we assume that debt with maturity of i.e. one week 
would be allowed by banks or FIs in general, it is likely that they would load up on them as 
much as possible. Yes, investors of these debt instrument would face price risk, nevertheless 
they could reject to roll over their debt en masse (as occurred through massive repo haircuts 
and rollover stops during GFC). A bank with a high maturity mismatch for instance by holding 
mostly long-term loans as assets could still face a credit crunch and have to fire-sell assets. The 
issue regarding liquidity positions of banks is in fact to some extent addressed by the Net Stable 
Funding Ratio (“NSFR”) and Liquidity Coverage Ratio (“LCR”) through the Basel Accords. 
Yet again, similar to Admati, Cochrane bemoans the regulatory overload of Basel III and 
thereby implicitly advocates for less of such “traditional” regulation. I.e. his solution would 
remove those aforementioned regulations with the probable side effect of an increase in 
liquidity risk. Pure deposit accounts would be (relatively) safe, due to the treasury backing, but 
it would be too simple to assume that systemic risk would be eliminated. 
  
Cochrane confesses that banks naturally would attempt to: “financial-engineer their way 
around restrictions on short-term debt issue, as they engineered their way around capital 
regulation. For example, a bank can synthesize borrowing by put-call parity in options 
markets” (Cochrane, 2014). He then argues that nonetheless “[d]etecting hidden run-prone 
financing will require a few regulators, but the project is an order of magnitude easier than 
current asset regulation, capital regulation, and stress testing” (Cochrane, 2014). But it is not 
really clear though on which basis his view is founded. Like he said himself, Banks would try 
to arbitrage their way around, so why should they not succeed? For instance, one can argue that 
banks might be tempted to engage in different types of “acceptance banking”. Banks could 
basically define for themselves whatever is classified as acceptable trade credit which could be 
guaranteed by banks or shadow banks. These acceptances might be circulated as money-
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equivalent just as in the 19th century with potentially destabilizing consequences. It might be 
hard to stop shadow banks from guaranteeing trade credit obligations in ways that replicate 
traditional deposit taking banking. Another more modern example would be cryptocurrencies 
that are privately created and somewhat used as a substitute to the FIAT money. 
Cochrane, also leaves out certain macro-economic considerations that are crucial elements of 
our current financial system. His proposals would undo the inside-money creation that banks 
currently undertake. Handing over money creation to public authorities without allowing 
private entities to engage might have disadvantageous results for the overall growth of the 
economy. This is because: “ ‘(…) [There are] positive benefits to private rather than public 
creation of purchasing power’ ” (Sissoko, 2016). As noted earlier on Admati, Cochrane 
understands the risk of gaming the system following plain equity ratio increases. Yet, he fails 
to see the same and other risk arising from his own proposal (or at least to elaborate on their 
management).  
 
To sum up, merely removing deposits from banks can have these aforementioned unintended 
consequences due to the “ ‘remarkable ability of innovative financial systems to replicate bank 
like maturity transformation’ ”(Sissoko, 2016). This, combined with the hazard of distressing 
the economy from removing banks’ ability to create money/liquidity for a growing economy, 
replacing this by pure outside money creation (100% reserve banking) should be a call for 
cautiousness. In fact, a recent paper by Banque de France analyzed the financials of 400 French 
Banks in 1930/1931 observing that despite an increase in the money supply (from the GVT) the 
French economy experience deflation and recession as a result of reduced credit provision. 
Deposits were moved to T-Bond backed accounts. And the central bank was unable make up 
for reduced bank credit provision (Banque de France, 2018).   
By and large, Cochrane’s solution would eliminate typical “banking” respectively inside money 
creation by traditional banks (and Shadow Banks). However, it might be difficult for regulators 
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to ensure that such policy is thoroughly enforced, and that banks or shadow conduits won’t find 
sophisticate ways to circumvent such legislation, i.e. through banker’s acceptances, 
cryptocurrencies, fancy derivative-structures or so called “near-monies” (cf.  Allen, The Journal 
of Law and Economics 1993). 
 
I thus score Cochrane’s framework as follows: 
Crisis Potential: Total Score: 1.5 of 3. Under Cochrane’s scenario FIs could invest any way 
they want; asset side regulation is removed. Very risky assets could be chosen alike to Admati’s 
proposal. Additionally, maturity mismatches would still be an issue for banks. These two factors 
could bring down any FI despite the new full backing of deposits through GVT securities. “Even 
once [full-reserve banking] is in place, a bank could still become insolvent or suffer a liquidity 
squeeze, with potentially disastrous results for those that had backed it and the economy as a 
whole” (The Economist, 2016). Such view is indeed backed by a respected central bank itself, 
the Swiss National Bank, which issued a statement regarding its opposing stance towards the 
introduction of full-reserve banking in Switzerland (see “Vollgeld Initiative” referendum). It 
argues a full-reserve banking system “(…) could not deliver on its promise to guarantee a 
secure financial system and ensure greater prosperity through directly issued central bank 
money. (…) A sovereign money system could not prevent credit cycles and asset bubbles.” 
(Swiss National Bank, 2018). Also, we are faced with the possibility of banks/shadow banks 
finding ways to circumvent the “ban on deposits”. Further, as indicated empirical research 
(Banque de France) using historical data suggests negative implications for economic growth 
and performance. This comes from transferring deposits from commercial to GVT-entities and 
thereby eliminating inside money creation, the remaining outside money creation by the Central 
Bank is an insufficient substitute.      
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Risk for depositors/investors: Total Score: 2 of 3. Traditional depositors would now hold on to 
de facto riskless GVT T-bills. Default risk would be non-existent, yet some price risk would 
indeed prevail (very low though, but even T-bill values are volatile). Further, it’s not fully clear 
that Cochrane would achieve the elimination of run-prone liabilities, i.e. the “run-free financial 
system” he propagates. Maturity transformation would still be conducted by banks with all 
likelihood, using the lowest maturity/duration permitted to fund longer-term loans. Any 
investors holding securities issued by banks or shadow entities other than then GVT-backed 
deposits would still face risks. This still creates liquidity risk for the debt providers of the 
banks/shadow banks.  
 
Implementation: Total Score 1.5 of 3.  Implementation could be of difficulty in that 100% 
reserve banking would have to be introduced and this ideally on a global scale to prevent 
arbitrage. Proponents of full-reserve banking believe a transition would be fairly easy. 
Economist Milton Friedman made this claim in 1965 as did the authors of the Chicago Plan in 
the 1930s (cf. Friedman, 1965; Douglas et al., 1939). Yet, practically a transition away from 
our current fractional reserve banking system is unprecedented and hence potential risks and 
repercussions from implementation are difficult to estimate.  
 
Regulatory arbitrage: Total Score 1.5 of 3. It would be more difficult compared to Admati’s 
proposal. Yet, full-reserve banking in the way that is proposed by Cochrane would very likely 
experience various arbitrage activities, through replication of deposits through near-monies, 
cryptocurrencies, banker’s acceptances etc. Beyond, arbitrage opportunities can arise by 
international regulatory differences.  
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Jonathan McMillan – The End of Banking  
One of the most extreme proposals regarding the regulation of the banking system (and 
implicitly shadow banking system) comes from the book “The End of Banking”. It advocates a 
complete overhaul of the banking and financial system via new accounting rules and use of 
online and algorithmic technology. This fundamental amendment would occur through the 
suggested “systemic solvency rule”. In essence, any company would only be allowed to hold 
as much financial assets as it holds equity in its balance sheet. The definition of financial assets 
is different from the traditional one. McMillan defines a financial asset as any asset which is in 
itself a liability on another company’s balance sheet. Henceforth, simple cash holdings for 
example would not be considered a financial asset anymore. This approach would lead to a case 
comparable to Cochrane’s one. Banks, non-banks and any private institution in general would 
be unable to create inside money for the economy following the introduction of the systemic 
solvency rule. The creation of money to support a growing economy would be put in the hands 
of government authorities, namely Central Banks.  Yet, as history has demonstrated a smooth 
and functioning outcome is contentious.  This critique can be formulated as follows: “(…) 
[McMillan’s] 100%-reserve banking reform does not address fluctuations in the demand for 
money. Centralised monetary authorities do neither have access to the right information, nor 
within the right timeframe, to accurately provide extra media of exchange when needed by the 
public. Private entities, in direct contact with the public, can.” (Noizet, 2015) 
 
Basically, one can grant the critique that through the systemic solvency rule and the required 
centralized money creation we would find our economies in a situation which in theory works 
frictionless. However, it practically creates an array of issues and mismatches that typically 
arise when public authorities intervene to achieve private market efficiencies.  As indicated 
earlier in relation to Cochrane’s suggestions, introducing a de facto 100% – reserve banking 
system would with all likelihood be “(…) unlikely to work, given the long history of financial 
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innovation in the face of new regulatory restrictions. Not only would new forms of money evolve 
outside the net, but so also would new sources of credit.” (Dow et al, 2015) 
 
Now, to put this development into context of McMillan’s proposals and the implied claim that 
P2P lending platforms will be fully stable (i.e. default free) after the systemic solvency rule is 
not that obvious. Yes, all forms of banking, i.e. inside money creation, whether traditional or 
“in the shadow”, would in theory be terminated. Yet, P2P platforms themselves might 
experience volatility to the detriment of (former) depositors who hold a preference for fixed 
value claims but are now forced to hold P2P loan-pool portfolios. In China which has the largest 
marketplace lending platforms in the world, 100’s of P2P platforms have defaulted already in 
2018 with investors (mostly individual savers) losing their investments. (Bloomberg, 2018). 
The investments into these P2P platforms in China were conducted to generate above-market 
returns, often by issuing loans to borrowers with questionable credibility. Investors are not 
using them as liquid, tradable deposit-like asset holding as envisioned by McMillan. 
Nevertheless, it is not obvious how McMillan can claim so confidently that marketplace lending 
platforms are as stable as they assert (already claimed in 2014).  A panic could occur one way 
or another and thereby cause volatility for individuals and their holdings in P2P asset portfolios. 
This would be an unfavourable outcome for all those people who today are just “ordinary 
depositors”.  
Another important aspect to consider is that McMillan advocates a cash-less society.  McMillan 
propagates the abolishment of cash without even discussing the associated downsides.   Privacy 
issues would be a huge concern and the main argument against a cashless monetary system. 
(Cochrane, 2016). For more insights on privacy in connection with cash see “(…) Kahn (2018) 
for a discussion on the importance of cash, focused on the (legitimate) role of privacy in 
transacting. Alternatively, some part of these transactions might migrate to private 
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cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin” (Bank of Canada, 2018). Cash has unique valuable 
characteristics which cannot be replaced by mere digital money (Bank of Canada, 2018).  
Finally, McMillan fails to describe how the systemic solvency rule could be implemented on a 
global scale, which is what is fundamentally needed for it to bear fruit in reining the financial 
system. Nowadays, “tax havens” are an ever-recurring matter of discussion and show how 
regulatory arbitrage can impact tax regimes. For the systemic solvency rule to have the impact 
which is envisioned by McMillan a global agreement between de facto all jurisdiction would 
be essential. As has been analysed and brought to light in numerous publications, international 
convergence of accounting standards proves immensely difficult.  
Cross-border adoption of accounting standards like the IFRS, far less groundbreaking than the 
systemic solvency rule would be, already pose vast implementation difficulties: “In spite of the 
international adoption of IFRS, numerous studies suggested that many countries, especially 
developing countries, lack necessary infrastructures for the consistent application of IFRS. 
Thus, the convergence of accounting standards on de jure level may not necessarily lead to 
convergence de facto.” (Xinyun, 2017). 
 
McMillan’s framework is scored the following: 
Crisis Potential: Total Score 2.5 of 3. Assuming the systemic solvency rule is indeed being 
implemented on a global mutual scale, fractional reserve banking and shadow banking would 
cease to exist which would lower structural risk to the economy and financial system anymore. 
capital misallocations respectively asset bubbles would have confined impact to immediate 
investors. Bank-runs in the historical sense would not exist and hence could not transpire in a 
way that happened during the GFC. Unlike Cochrane’s solution a buildup of asset bubbles is 
also less likely due to the systemic solvency rule where debt cannot be used to purchase 
financial assets.  Empirical research studies show credit-fueled bubbles are much more 
damaging than those without much leverage (University of Bonn & University of California – 
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joint study, 2015). According to the study, recessions following equity bubble bursts are worse 
if fueled by debt. Hence, one can claim that McMillan’s full-reserve banking system is superior 
to Cochrane’s in averting the negative impact of crises. Both Cochrane and McMillan advocate 
a full-reserve system, however Cochrane still allows for credit to fund other credit which is not 
an option in McMillan’s framework.  
 
Risk for Depositors/Investors: Total Score 2 of 3. Depositors would now be forced to hold a 
portfolio of pooled loans as a substitute for bank deposits. This exposes them to price risk. Yet, 
with the presumption that these P2P marketplace portfolio shares are holding triple-A loans (i.e. 
with very low risk and with the implicit very low returns) we would have a quasi-deposit with 
merely small volatility. Volatility would be a fraction of those on a stock portfolio. Even market 
values of corporate bonds nowadays are around 1/3 as volatile as stocks (BlackRock, 2018). 
Certain studies however back the view that adverse selection/moral hazard issues are currently 
existing throughout P2P lending platforms (Käfer, 2016). Statistical testing on P2P products 
with a different risk/return outlook indicate that especially lower-rated loan portfolios have 
recently failed to sufficiently make up their higher risks through returns (c.f. Emekter et al. 
2015).  
 
Implementation: Total Score 0.5 of 3. Implementation would by far be the biggest hurdle 
concerning McMillan’s proposal. Problems arise on many fronts. As exemplified above, as of 
now it is hard to see political ability or even willingness to converge the accounting standards 
we have today on a global scale. Thus, it’s hard to imagine how a rule as fundamentally 
disruptive as the systemic solvency rule could experience successful implementation.  The 
abolishment of cash as money-medium also entails an array of unaddressed problems and 
concerns on a cash-free society are still overwhelming.  
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Regulatory arbitrage: Total Score 2 of 3. Again, by assuming a full implementation of the 
systemic solvency rule around the world, regulatory arbitrage in the traditional sense would be 
rendered infeasible due to the end of inside money creation and the financing of financial assets 
with debt. However, even in this case, it remains an issue how well the rule could be enforced 
and if fraudulent accounting activities (and auditing) would not be able to circumvent the 
systemic solvency rule.  
 
Conclusion 
This thesis aimed to evaluate controversial policy recommendations on how to regulate our 
current financial and banking system, including shadow banking, so that systemic crisis risk is 
reduced (or even removed), and steady economic growth is supported. A scoring system was 
used to assess 4 crucial factors to be addressed by 3 policy frameworks and how shadow 
banking in particular is adequately dealt with. The scoring implies that McMillan’s policy 
proposal is the most valuable. John Cochrane is the second-best and Admati comes last. The 
concepts of the policy proposals are fairly unique, and it becomes clear that each has its own 
advantages and drawbacks. Nonetheless, the total score of each proposal eventually adds up to 
an almost equal outcome. The individual drawbacks have been a major focus in this thesis as 
they are highly relevant in assessing the actual value of the individual proposals and which for 
obvious reasons are barely discussed by the authors themselves. Neither of the three policies 
analyzed is close of being implemented as of today, not just due to their very disruptive nature 
but because of the uncertainties and side effects which are elaborated on in this paper.  
 
The conclusion is that if any of these policy frameworks would ever be considered by monetary 
authorities a prudent in-depth analysis of the downsides, trade-offs and implications would be 
absolutely essential.  Before a chosen policy would then be implemented, a contingency plan 
would be required so that all the relevant side effects could be dealt with adequately.    
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